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THAILAND'S STATE ENTERPRISE
LABOR RELATIONS ACT:
DENYING PUBLIC EMPLOYEES THE RIGHT OF
ASSOCIATION AND THE RIGHT TO ORGANIZE AND
BARGAIN COLLECTIVELY
Kelly A. Doelman
Abstract: On April 15, 1991, Thailand's new legislative body enacted the State
Enterprise Labor Relations Act, removing public employees from the dominion of the
Labor Relations Act and dissolving the existing public labor unions. This Act has had a
crippling effect on the entire Thai labor movement, which historically relied on the
leadership and influence of public unions to promote private industry worker interests.
This Comment argues that the State Enterprise Labor Relations Act contains many
provisions which violate internationally accepted labor standards, specifically the right
of association and the right to organize and bargain collectively. This Comment further
asserts that the Act should be amended to conform with these standards so that it meets
the needs of both the Thai government and public enterprise workers.
Before 1991, both state and private enterprise workers in Thailand
organized unions under the Labor Relations Act of 1975. On February 23,
1991, a military coup acting under the name "National Peacekeeping Council"
(NPKC) overthrew the democratically-elected Thai government. The new
government abolished the existing Thai constitution and legislature.' Five
days later, the NPKC took its first step in altering the labor laws when it
released Announcement No. 54 as an amendment to the 1975 Labor Relations
Act (LRA).2 On April 15, 1991, an NPKC-selected National Legislative
Assembly, under Prime Minister Anand Panyarachun, approved final changes
to the existing labor laws by enacting the State Enterprise Labor Relations
Act (SELRA), a separate law for state enterprise workers which dissolved
labor unions at state enterprises. 3 The bill passed swiftly and unanimously. 4
1 DEPARTMENT OF STATE, CouNTRY REPORTS ON HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES FOR 1991, Washington:
U.S. Government Printing Office, 1992, at 996 [hereinafter COuNTRY REPORTS].
2 The AFL-CIO Petition to the Office of the U.S. Trade Representative, Prepared by the AFL-CIO
International Affairs Department (Case No. 008-CP-91), June 1991, at 106 [hereinafter AFL-CIO
Petition]. Announcement No. 54 added rigorous qualification requirements and appointment procedures
for advisors to employer or employee representatives. With regards to strikes, Announcement No. 54
added a secret ballot requirement.
3 Vithoon Amorn, Thai Legislature Passes Lmvs To Disband State Labour Unions, THE REUTER
LIBRARY REPORT, Apr. 15, 1991, available in LEXIS, Nexis library, Intl. File.
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The NPKC viewed the changes to the labor laws, particularly the
enactment of SELRA, as one of the coup's major victories.5 One of the main
goals of the coup was to end the public unions which allegedly interfered with
the government's efforts to privatize. 6 The amendment dissolved over 120
unions in more than sixty state enterprises. 7
The State Enterprise Labor Relations Act enacted by the NPKC
contains numerous provisions which violate the internationally recognized
right of association and the right to organize and bargain collectively. 8 Many
of SELRA's regulations must be changed if it is to come into compliance with
internationally recognized labor standards and provide state enterprise
employees with effective means to promote their social and economic
interests in the workplace.
This Comment reviews the impact of SELRA on the right of
association as well as the right to organize and bargain collectively. Part One
examines the historical background of the Thai organized labor movement
and political climate to provide the context for an analysis of SELRA. Part
Two explains the internationally recognized labor standards promulgated by
the International Labour Organisation (ILO) that are used to evaluate SELRA.
Part Three analyzes and evaluates provisions of SELRA specifically in terms
of their compatibility, or incompatibility, with the right of association, and the
right to organize and bargain collectively. Finally, this Comment proposes
that SELRA be amended to conform with international labor standards in
order to meet the needs of both the Thai government and public enterprise
workers.
4 The National Legislative Assembly members were all appointed by the NPKC. Four labor leaders
were among those appointed. The bills were passed by a margin of 223 to 4, with the four labor leaders
voting against the measures. U.S. Embassy, Bangkok; FOREIGN LABOR TRENDS: THAILAND 14, 21(1992 [hereinafter FOREIGN LABOR TRENDS].
Thais In Bid To Regain Right To Strike, THE STRArrs TIMES, Oct. 3, 1992, at 20.
6 Mark Magnier, Thai Unions to Seek Support From International Groups: New Government is
Threat to Labor, JOURNAL OF COMMERCE AND COMMERCIAL, Mar. 22, 1991, at 3(A).
7 Suraphol Tourn-ngern, Big Union Groups Call For ILO To Act On Thailand, BANGKOK POST,
May 23, 1991, at 1.
8 See infra text accompanying notes 96-106.
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PART ONE
I. OVERVIEW: REFORMATION OF THAI LABOR LAW BY THE STATE
ENTERPRISE LABOR RELATIONS ACT
The State Enterprise Labor Relations Act removes state workers from
the dominion of the Labor Relations Act of 1975 (LRA).9 In defending the
enactment of SELRA, the Anand government reasoned that public employees
are inherently different from private workers in both purpose and structure,
due to the types of services they provide the public and because they are paid
by the government. 10  The enactment of SELRA addressed these
differences."
The new SELRA regulations are a marked departure from the
regulations of private enterprises under the LRA. Under SELRA, state
enterprise workers can no longer form unions, but are authorized to form
"associations."' 2 SELRA also regulates the formation of associations and
their rights and powers in the employer-employee relationship. The new
regulations govern how many members are necessary to form an association,
who may act as a representative of an association, and when associations may
hold meetings. SELRA also prohibits strikes by state enterprise workers.
13
II. HISTORY OF THAI WORKER RIGHTS: AN EVOLUTION INFLUENCED BY
VOLATILE GOVERNMENTS AND SOCIAL CONDITIONS
The history of Thai labor legislation and the Thai labor movement
reveals a close parallel between changes in Thai labor conditions and changes
in the government. Thailand has been the subject of numerous military
government takeovers and has had thirteen new Constitutions since the
9 Labor Relations Act [LRA] (Thail.). The LRA formally provides for the formation and functioning
of labor unions. See infra text accompanying notes 51-57.
10 FORaIGN LABOR TRENDS, supra note 4, at 21; Complaints Against the Government of Thailand
Presented by the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions, Several International Workers'
Organisations, the International Federation of Building and Woodworkers (Case No. 1581), at 452,
[hereinafter Complaints Against Thailand] (Review by Freedom of Association Committee of Governing
Body of ILO).
I I Complaints Against Thailand, supra note 10, at 453.
12 Unions and associations are both organizations which represent workers, but associations are
more limited in scope. The difference between the two types of organizations is derived from the
respective laws which govern each. This difference will become apparent as the rights, powers and duties
of each organization are examined. Infra.
13 State Enterprise Labor Relations Act [SELRA], Section 19, (Thail.).
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inception of the constitutional monarchy in 1932.14 Worker dissatisfaction
and labor disputes are recurring problems for every Thai administration.
A. The Early Years of Formal Labor Policy
The Thai government announced its first formal labor policy in 1932.15
The labor announcement was a response to the problem of unemployment
stemming from a depression. The unemployment problem played a major
role in the coup that ushered in the constitutional monarchy which replaced
the absolute monarchy. 16 The new government attempted to be visionary in
its new labor policy, which had two goals: first, to provide job opportunities
for everyone, and, second, to support the Thai people in earning their
livelihoods. 17
Subsequent legislation gave the Thai governmenit control over informal
organizations for the first time. 18 The legislation prohibited the formation of
political parties and Chinese secret societies. 19 Despite this control, informal
organizations continued to strike.20
In 1939 the Thai government enacted the Thai Workers Act.21 This act
required that Thai nationals comprise at least fifty percent of the workforce in
certain occupations. 2 2 During the early years of the constitutional monarchy,
the labor force consisted largely of Chinese workers.23 The Act was intended
to end control of these occupations by Chinese workers and the problems
they caused.24 The Thai Workers Act, however, could not prevent the
14 Ted L. McDorman, The Teaching of the Law of Thailand, 11 DALHOUsiE L.J. 915, 927 (1988).
15 LABOuR ADMINISTRATION: PROFILE ON THAILAND, INTERNATIONAL LABOUR ORGANISATION,
ASIAN AND PACIFIC REGIONAL CENTRE FOR LABOUR ADMINISTRATION 3 (1988) [hereinafter PROFILE ON
THAILAND].
16 VIRGINIA THOMPSON, LABOR PROBLEMS IN SOUrHEAST ASIA 230 (1947).
17 PROFILE ON THAILAND, supra note 15, at 3.
18 BEVARS D. MABRY, THE DEVELOPMENT OF LABOR INSTrrurIONS IN THAILAND 39 (1979);
THOMPSON, supra note 16, at 230.
19 The secret societies were the Chinese equivalent of the Mafia. MABRY, supra note 18, at 37.
They were often violent, and were viewed as the cause of strikes and general unrest. THOMPSON, supra
note 16, at 230.
20 Although strikes were somewhat unusual in Thailand, the combination of social, political and
economic distress was enough to incite worker protest, and a series of strikes began in 1932. MABRY,
supra note 18, at 40. These strikes were provoked by expectations of better conditions under the new
government. THOMPSON, supra note 16, at 239.
21 MABRY, supra note 18, at 41.
22 Id.
23 THOMPSON, supra note 16, at 230.
24 These Chinese workers were the primary participants of strike activity. MABRY, supra note 18, at
40-41.
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Chinese community from continuing to influence the labor movement;25 nor
did it put an end to strike activity.26
In 1954, rival political factions became the impetus for the organization
of new labor groups. 27 Soon after political parties became legal, politicians
realized the value in having the support of labor organizations. For the first
time, Thai leaders became responsive to the Thai workers. 28 As a result of
this favored treatment, as well as the suppression of the Chinese, Thais began
to supplant Chinese in the labor movement as they increasingly obtained more
jobs in industry. 29
B. Favorable Legislation for Thai Workers
Legislation favorable to Thai workers soon followed. In 1955, the
Interior Ministry established an official labor division.30 In 1957, Thailand
enacted a new labor code that not only regulated wages, hours, and labor
laws for women and children, but also permitted the formation of labor unions
and federations.31 Furthermore, it gave workers the right to organize and
bargain collectively,32 and legalized the right to strike. A legal strike could
occur only after the parties went through the dispute settlement procedure
promulgated under the code.33
The 1957 code also established a Labor Relations Committee (LRC) to
hear complaints and mediate disputes. A strike could not be instigated until a
dispute had been before the LRC for at least 20 days. After that period,
workers were required to give seven days notice before they could legally
strike.34 The workers generally ignored the procedure for two reasons. First,
the restriction on strikes left the workers without an adequate alternative to
express dissatisfaction. Second, due to its past decisions, the LRC gained a
25 Id. at 43. See also, G. WILuAM SKINNER, REPORT ON THE CHINESE IN SOUTHEAST ASIA 4, 11
(1951k The strikes were largely a result of disparity between rising living costs and low wages.
THOMPSON, supra note 16, at 243.2 7 MABRY, supra note 18, at 44.
2 8 1d at 45.
291d.
301d
31 HARRIET (PALMER) Micoccl, LABOR LAW AND PRACTICE IN THAILAND 32 (1972).
32 MABRY, supra note 18, at 46.
33Id.a
341Id at 47.
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reputation among workers as being pro-management.35 Thus, despite the
new labor code, strike activity continued.
Most strike activity concerned wages and worker grievances. Politics
was also a factor, as politicians became more involved in promoting and
sponsoring the formation of new unions.36 The Thai government viewed the
increase of organizations and strike and lockout activity as a threat to the
peace and stability of the country and the normally cooperative spirit between
workers and employers. 37 Coupled with the negative view that labor unions
were the politicians' pawns, the disruptive strike activity gave the new
military government ajustification for banning unions in 1958.38
C. The Labor Movement Without Unions
The absence of unions did not have a severe affect on the social and
economic scene in Thailand because the labor movement had already been
relatively weak. But it did mark the beginning of a fourteen-year period in
which formal labor organizations did not exist. Despite this, strikes
continued. The major issues behind the strikes were wages, poor working
conditions and the failure of the employers to follow labor laws.39
1. The Labor Dispute Settlement Act of 1965: An Attempt to Deal With
Conflict in the Workplace
The Thai legislature enacted the Labor Dispute Settlement Act of 1965
to deal with conflicts and issues arising in the workplace. 40 The Act provided
for an elected group to represent workers within each business, in lieu of the
representation workers previously received from their own organizations.
The representatives' task was to present worker grievances through a three
step mediation process. 41 If the mediation failed, parties were advised to
35 Id.
361d.
3 7 Mcoccl, supra note 31, at 32; MABRY, supra note 18, at 47.
38 Micocci, supra note 31, at 32.
39 MABRY, supra note 18, at 49.40 1d.
41 The first step was to formulate written demands and present them to the opposing party for
negotiations. Within seven days of receipt of the demand, the parties were to engage in negotiations for
up to 30 days. At the end of negotiations, if the parties still were not in agreement, as a second step, the
dispute was referred to a Labor Mediation officer of the Department of Labor for 15 to 30 days in an
attempt to reach settlement. MABRY, supra note 18, at 49-50.
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accept binding arbitration. If one of the parties rejected arbitration, workers
could then legally strike.42
Ironically, the Labor Dispute Settlement Act was ineffective in
resolving disputes. The Act was too complicated for workers to understand
and thus they were reluctant to use the mechanism. In addition to its
complexity, the procedure required workers to meet with their employer face
to face. This type of direct confrontation contradicted Thai culture.43 The
strike, on the other hand, provided an impersonal method of demonstrating
dissatisfaction. Thus, strikes, although usually illegal, continued to be the
preferred form for airing grievances. 44
2. Announcement 103: The Right to Organize
Workers enjoyed the formal right to organize again in 1972 when
Announcement 103 authorized the formation of worker associations. 45 The
legislation came in response to increased strike activity. Officials felt the
pressure of labor unrest. They acknowledged the existence of communication
barriers between workers and management and the inadequacy of the process
for alleviating job dissatisfaction. Furthermore, labor officials experienced
pressure from the international community; members of the International
Labour Organisation (ILO) pressured the ILO to express disapproval of
Thailand's suppression of labor organizations. 46
Despite the positive steps taken with this new legislation, labor
associations in Thailand possessed little freedom to organize and negotiate
when compared with Western labor organizations.47 The regulations tried to
4 2 1d. at 50.
43 McDorman, supra note 14, at 926; MABRY, supra note 18, at 50.
44 In fact, in the six years following the Act, there were 113 strikes. These strikes tended to be of
short duration, typically less than a day, and were used primarily to draw the employer's attention to
worker grievances. MABRY, supra note 18, at 50-51.
5 Id. at 53. Under Announcement 103, the requirements for the formation of associations were as
follows: (1) a minimum of ten members were required for the formation of an association; (2) newly
formed associations were required to register with the Department of Labor, (3) the associations could
only form with members from within the enterprise or of a single occupation. The associations could not
encompass employees from more than one province; and (4) national unions were prohibited. Id. at 54.
See also Micocci, supra note 31, at 32-33.
46 MABRY, supra note 18, at 51-52. "Thailand has long been sensitive to her international image,
and the increasing criticisms leveled against her by world organizations in positions to influence her
access to developmental funds, forced her to reconsider her opposition to labor organizations and to
develop a positive labor union policy."
4' Micocci, supra note 31, at 32.
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keep the associations small and diverse to keep them weak.48 Furthermore,
the regulations did not require employers to recognize associations as the
workers' representatives. Although employers were required to hear worker
demands, they were not required to negotiate with workers.49
Announcement 103 also provided for the repeal of the Labor Dispute
Settlement Act of 1965.50 This procedure for dispute settlement was replaced
by a system whereby disputes went through a Mediation Officer for
resolution, and if mediation failed, to the Labor Relations Committee. 51
The same problems that existed under the 1965 Act persisted under
this new system guided by the LRC. Legal strikes could be delayed up to
105 days while mediation and arbitration efforts continued. Yet strike
activity persisted, and even increased, during this time, reflecting the social
unrest and poor economic conditions in Thailand. 52
D. Labor Relations Act of 1975: Formation of Unions Authorized
The outlook for worker rights grew brighter in 1975 when the Thai
government enacted the Labor Relations Act.53 Resulting from yet another
change in government, the LRA was an effort by the new government to
speed up the dispute resolution process by reducing the waiting period
required for legal strikes. 54 The most prominent change made by the LRA
was a provision on the formation and functioning of labor unions.55 The
rights of worker associations were expanded while the old organizations
transformed into unions.56
48 Government and businessmen, the latter of which was comprised of many government leaders,
feared that strong, active associations would hurt their profits and the economy by demands for higher
wages and disruptive disputes. MABRY, supra note 18, at 52.4 9 ld. at 54.5 0 1d. at 56.
51 Micocct, supra note 31, at 34. The Labor Relations Committee (LRC) was comprised of nine
members whose duty was to process unfair labor practices, arbitrate labor disputes and engage in fact
finding missions. The LRC was headed by the Director-General of the Department of Labor and also had
members of the public, namely university professors, seated on it. MABRY, supra note 18, at 54.
52 Grievances over issues such as layoffs, bonus cuts, and poor working conditions motivated the
strikes. MABRY, supra note 18, at 56.
53 The Labor Relations Act of 1975, in amended form, is still in effect today.5 4 MABRY, supra note 18, at 62.5 5 LRA, Ch. VII (Tail.).
56 The new Labor Relations Act also provides for the formation of national labor federations
(Sections 103(7) and 113); the establishment of employee committees to confer with management (Section
45); and paid leave to union leaders in order to attend to union business (Section 102). Union leaders are
shielded from criminal penalties for organizing strikes (Section 99). Also, employers are forbidden from
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The LRA encouraged cooperative efforts in the determination of
wages, hours and conditions of employment by requiring employers and
employees to enter into written agreements specifying rules and grievance
procedures. 57 It also condensed the old settlement procedure. 58 Most unions
made an effort to comply with the new procedures, but the change was
difficult for workers. They remained predisposed to striking first and
negotiating later.59
The new unions formed under the LRA made progress in gaining
improved working conditions. 60 These efforts were further assisted by
federations.61 In 1976, the first major federation of unions, the Labor Council
of Thailand, formed. Many of the officers of this federation were leaders of
state enterprise unions. The federation represented organized labor and led
campaigns on various issues, including the subsidizing of rice prices for urban
workers, the extension of labor laws, and the upgrading of the Department of
Labor to ministry status. The federation also assisted workers in disputes,
aided the formation of unions, and often acted as a conciliator.
62
E. Led by the Public Sector, Thai Labor Becomes Activist
Before the military coup in 1991 and the enactment of SELRA, three
percent of the industrialized work force was organized into unions, totaling
330,000 registered union members.63 The number of registered unions was
732, with 140 of these being state enterprise unions from sixty-one state
enterprises. 64  One-half of total union membership came from public
enterprises, which made up the largest and strongest unions. 65 Among these,
5 7 LRA, Ch. I (Thail.).
58 Strikes are illegal if the party has not communicated a written notice to negotiate issues, given a
three-day waiting period for negotiations to begin (Section 16), informed the mediator and permitted the
mediator five days to resolve the conflict (Sections 21 and 22). The parties can then agree to appoint an
arbitrator (Section 26). Alternatively, the aggrieved party can opt to strike, but must first give a
twenty-four-hour notice of intent to strike (Section 34).
t MABRY, supra note 18, at 100.
60 The unions' functions consisted of bargaining with employers regarding wages, hours, terms and
conditions; processing worker complaints; assisting in labor law enforcement; and acting as spokesperson
for the working class. Id. at 77.
61 Federations are national organizations comprised of many labor unions within the same trade or
enterprise, or with the same interests.6 2 MABRY, supra note 18, at 72-73.
6 3 FoPEIGNLABoR TRENDS, supra note 4, at 8.
6 4 1d.
65 Public and private organized labor groups worked together for improvements in wages and salary,
a system of social security, privatization, industrial health and safety, and ending the exploitation of
temporary workers and child labor. Id. at 4.
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the State Enterprise Labor Relations Group was the strongest single labor
organization. 66
Public sector unions were the "cornerstone" of the labor movement
during this time.67 They were far better organized than private sector unions,
often providing funds and expertise to their private sector counterparts. 68
Public sector unions also carried more clout because of their ability to affect
the economy. 69 In 1988, for example, the union at the Electrical Generating
Authority of Thailand nearly shut down Thailand's economy over the issue of
privatization. 70
Not only was the strength of public sector unions important to
organized workers, all Thai workers benefited from the power of these
unions. The labor movement played a vital role in the human rights of all
Thai citizens. Thailand is notorious for its poor working conditions, rampant
with child labor, prostitution and unsafe conditions.71 The existing laws
protecting workers are barely enforced, if at all.72 Human rights often
conflict with the government's goal of providing low-cost labor to foreign
investors. Thus, Thai workers need someone to represent their interests. The
labor movement as a whole was instrumental in raising issues such as the
exploitation of temporary workers and child labor, wages and safety. 73 Not
surprisingly, the enactment of SELRA came as a major blow to the entire
labor movement.
I. NEGATIVE REACTION TO SELRA
The passage of SELRA elicited negative reactions. In Thailand itself,
several judges of the Central Labor Court74 protested by resigning from their
6 6 1d. at 8.
67 Philip Smucker, Labor leaders struggle to have their say, INTER PRESS SERVICE, Sept. 20, 1988,
available in LEXIS, Nexis library, Intl file.
68 FOREIGN LABOR TRENDS, supra note 4, at 20.
691d.
70 Why EGAT is a tough nut to crack, THE FINANCIAL TIMES LIMITED, Apr. 9, 1990, available in
LEXIS Nexis library, Intl file.
71 See COUNTRY REPORTS, supra note 1, at 1008, 1011. See also FOREIGN LABOR TRENDS, supra
note 4 at 24 25
12 COrNTRY REPORTS, supra note 1, at 1008.
73 FOREIGN LABOR TRENDS, supra note 4, at 4.
74 The Central Labor Court was established in 1979. It is tripartite in nature, composed of a chief
justice and an equal number of employee and employer associates elected by trade unions and employers'
associations. The court considers issues regarding disputes over rights and obligations under a contract of
employment, under labor protection laws or labor relation laws, and cases arising from commission of
torts which derive from labor disputes. The court also takes appeals from rulings of officials or awards
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positions. 75 Outside Thailand, the International Confederation of Free Trade
Unions (ICFTU)7 6 and other international organizations condemned SELRA
as a violation of worker rights. These organizations viewed the workers as "a
crucial segment of society and important instruments of social change."
77
They expressed concern over the impact the anti-union action might have on
the economic and social development of Thailand.78 The ICFTU and five
other international labor organizations filed a formal complaint with the
International Labour Organisation. 79  Upon review of the situation in
Thailand, the Freedom of Association Committee of the ILO urged Thailand
to repeal its legislation. 80 The ICFTU also threatened to impose trade
sanctions, asking affiliated organizations to take measures to withhold or
withdraw trade from Thailand.81
In the United States, the American Federation of Labor and Congress
of Industrial Organizations (AFL-CIO) has filed a petition against Thailand,
requesting that the United States withdraw the privileges Thailand receives
82
under the Generalized System of Preferences (GSP). 83  The AFL-CIO's
petition contends that SELRA violates workers' rights, specifically the
made by the Labor Relations Committee of the Minister of Interior. Its decisions are appealable to
Thailand's Supreme Court on questions of law. PROFILE ON THAILAND, supra note 15, at 48, 55.
75 The judges believed the Thai military government's enactment of SELRA signaled the downfall
of democracy in Thailand. Judges quit in support of unions, BANGKOK POST, Apr. 16, 1991, at 1.
76 The ICFTU is an international organization comprised of individual national organizations which
are independent of outside authority. ICFTU provides support for local trade union movements in
developing countries and strives to defend human rights, particularly freedom of association. The ICFTU
has close relations with the ILO in its endeavors. VIcroR-YvEs GHEBAI, THE INTERNATIONAL LABOUR
ORGANISATION: A CASE STUDY ON THE EVOLUTION OF U.N. SPECIALIZED AGENCIEs 31-33 (Robert Ago
and Nicolas Valticos, eds., 1989).
77 World labour group condemns Thailand, BANGKOK PosT, Apr. 18, 1991, at 1.
7 8 1d.
79 Complaints Against Thailand, supra note 10.
80 Complaints Against Thailand, supra note 10, at 482.
81 1CFI"U aims tough blow at Thailand, BANGKOK POST, July 2, 1991, at 1. One method.to
accomplish this is to refuse to handle cargo originating from Thailand at ports where there are ICFTU
affiliates. This method was used against Malaysia in the past. Id.
82 In 1990, Thailand shipped $1.2 billion of exports into the United States under the GSP.
Pornpimol Kanchanalak, Panel takes up request to block GSP benefits, BANGKOK POST, Aug. 7, 1991, at
I.
83 The GSP program authorizes the President to grant duty free treatment to eligible imports from
beneficiary developing countries. Trade preferences are conditioned on the country's adherence to
internationally recognized labor standards. The United States has chosen five worker rights from the ILO
conventions which it considers "internationally recognized." They include: (1) the right of association;
(2) the right to organize and bargain collectively; (3) prohibition of forced or compulsory labor, (4) a
minimum age of employment for children; and (5) acceptable conditions of work and occupational safety
and health. 19 U.S.C. § 2461, et seq. (1988).
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freedom of association84 and the right to strike and bargain collectively. 85 In
July 1992, after reviewing the petition, the GSP Subcommittee found that
Thailand was not taking adequate steps to protect free association rights.86
Since then, final review has been extended twice to allow the new
government to establish itself and bring SELRA into compliance with
international labor standards. 87  The committee granted the extensions
because the newest Thai government 88 expressed a willingness to amend the
labor laws governing state enterprise workers.89
PART TWO
I. INTERNATIONALLY RECOGNIZED BASIC LABOR STANDARDS.
The complaints against Thailand allege that SELRA violates
fundamental worker rights. The International Labour Organisation (ILO)
promulgates standards that define these basic rights. This section examines
the right of association and the right to organize and bargain collectively as
defined by the ILO. It then argues that these standards should be used to
evaluate SELRA.
A. The International Labour Organisation Defines Standards for Labor
Relations
The International Labour Organisation (ILO) was founded in 1919 with
forty-two member countries, including Thailand.90 In 1945, the 1LO entered
into an agreement with the United Nations, and became the first specialized
84 AFL-CIO Petition, supra note 2, at 106-108.
85 Id. at 108-109.
86 1991 GSP ANNUAL REvWEW, WORKER RIGHTS RErvIEw SUMMARY, THAILAND (Case No.
008-CP-91), July 1992, at 9 [hereinafter GSP REvIEw].87 ld. at 9; U.S. Delays Action Against Thai Exporters, BUSINESS TIMES, Dec. 3, 1992, at 8.
88 The latest Thai government is under the leadership of Prime Minister Chuan Leepkai, who was
democratically elected in Sept. 1992. Democrat Leader is New Thai PM, THE INDEPENDENT, Sept. 24,
1992, available in LEXIS, Nexis library, Omi file.
89 Chuan Takes the Axe to Revolutionary Orders, BANGKOK POST, Oct. 15, 1992, at 1. The
government has not stated to what extent it will amend SELRA. Some mention has been made of
restoring unions within the public enterprises, but nothing of what rights these unions will have.
90 GHEBAU, supra note 76, at 115.
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agency of the United Nations.9 1 As of 1988, the ILO's membership had
increased to 150 member countries.
92
The ILO is a tripartite organization comprised of governments and
representatives of employers and workers. Its highest priority is to defend
human rights and implement international labor standards.93 In addition to
establishing labor standards, the ILO reviews complaints submitted by
member countries and organizations.94  The Freedom of Association
Committee of the Governing Body95 is set up within the JLO specifically to
deal with complaints concerning violations of union rights.96
The LO does not have enforcement authority. Once a violation is
determined, the normal course of action is to draw the violating country's
attention to the LO's concerns and make recommendations to bring the
country into compliance. The opinions set forth by the Freedom of
Association Committee help define the meaning of applicable conventions
and provide a comparative basis for guidance when reviewing future alleged
violations.97
91 G.A. Res. 133, U.N. Doc. A/64, at 78 (1947). Text of the Agreement between the United Nations
and the International Labour Organisation, reprinted in INTERNATIONAL LABOUR OFFICE, CONST. OF THE
INT'L. LABOUR ORG. AND STANDING ORDERS OF THE IN. LABOUR CoNF. (1988).
92 GHEBAU, supra note 76, at 26.
93 All members of the ILO have a common responsibility to work toward achieving the goals of the
organization. They work together to enunciate ILO objectives and set labor standards by promulgating
conventions, which provide specific guidelines of acceptable labor standards. [REPORT OF THE
DIRECTOR-GENERAL 149 (Eleventh Annual Asian Regional Conference - Bangkok, Nov.-Dec. 1991)
International Labour Office.] Once a convention is drafted, it is sent out to each member country for
ratification. The country is then free to ratify the convention, and if it does, it is expected to comply with
it. Each country is reviewed each year as to their compliance with ratified conventions. FAYE LYLE,
WORKERRIGHTS IN U.S. POLiCY 2 (1991).9 4 Typically, a country must be a member of the ILO before the Freedom of Association Committee
will review allegations against it, however, when the United Nations transmits a complaint regarding a
nonmember country, the Committee will review the allegations if the government concerned gives its
consent and the complaint is considered suitable for review. International Labour Office, FREEDOM OF
ASSOCIATION: DIGEST OF DECISIONS AND PRINCIPLES OF THE FREEDOM OF ASSOCIATION COMMrrrEE OF THE
GOVERNING BODY OF THE ILO (3d ed., 1985) 5 [hereinafter DIGEST OFDEcIsIONS].
95 The Freedom of Association Committee reflects the tripartite character of the ILO. It is
composed of nine members representing government, employer and worker groups. It examines
complaints made, then makes a recommendation to the Governing Body as to what action to take or if
further examination by the Fact-Finding and Conciliation Commission is necessary. Id. at 6.9 6 1d. at 1.
9 7 1d. at 1-2.
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B. The ILO Conventions
There are 171 ILO conventions, governing a variety of labor
standards. 98  While not all of these conventions have gained uniform
acceptance, the right of association99 and the right to organize and bargain
collectively, 0 0 as found in 1LO conventions 87 and 98, respectively, are
internationally accepted.'01 In fact, they are considered the two basic ILO
instruments governing union rights.'0 2 This Comment places primary concern
on these rights because of their major importance to union rights.
1. The Right of.Association
The right of association, as defined by ILO Convention No. 87,
provides that: (1) employees and employers "shall have the right to establish
and . . . to join organisations of their own choosing without previous
authorization;"'1 3 (2) the organizations shall have the right to make their own
constitutions, elect their representatives "in fill freedom", and establish an
administration; 10 4 and (3) the organizations have the right to join
federations. 10 5 Convention No. 87 also provides that the organizations "shall
not be liable to be dissolved or suspended by administrative authority." 106
Finally, Article 11 of Convention 87 specifically provides for the protection
of the right to organize.10 7
9 8 
M.J. BOWMAN AND D.J. HARRIS, MULTILATERAL TREATIES: INDEX & CURRENT STATISTICS (8th
cum. supp. 1991).
99 Freedom ofAssociation and Protection of the Right to Organize Convention, ILO Convention
No. 87 (1948). (Ratified by 99 countries as of 1991.)
100 Right to Organize and Collective Bargaining Convention, ILO Convention No. 98 (1949).
(Ratified by 115 countries as of 1991.)
101 See infra text accompanying notes 116-117.
102 M.J. BOWMAN AND D.J. HARRIS, MULTILATERAL TREATIES: INDEX AND CURRENT STATISTICS
152 (1984).
103 ILO Convention No. 87 art. 2.
104 Id. art. 3.
10 5 Id. art. 5.
106,ld art. 4.
107 Article 11 states: "Each Member of the International Labour Organisation for which this
Convention is in force undertakes to take all necessary and appropriate measures to ensure that workers
and employers may exercise freely the right to organise." Other articles of Convention No. 87 express,
inter alia, a prohibition on public authorities from interfering with the rights under this convention (art.
2) and a caveat that the Convention only apply to armed forces and police as determined by national law
(art. 9).
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2. Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively Under ILO Convention
No. 98
Convention No. 98 concerns the right to organize and bargain
collectively. Whereas the right of association defines the relationship of
employer and worker organizations with the government, the right to organize
and bargain collectively involves the rights of workers' organizations in
dealing with their employers.' 08 Convention No. 98 provides foremost that
"workers shall enjoy the adequate protection against acts of anti-union
discrimination in respect of their employment."' 09 In addition, Convention
No. 98 prohibits interference in the functioning of an employee organization
by employer organizations." 0  The convention encourages voluntary
negotiations between employers and workers"' and advises each country to
establish appropriate "machinery" to ensure that the right to organize is
allowed." 2 Convention No. 98 also states that it is not addressing "the
position of public servants engaged in the administration of the State, nor
shall it be construed as prejudicing their rights or status in any way. 1 13
II. APPLYING CONvENTIONS No. 87 AND 98 TO THAI LABOR LAWS.
The use of Conventions No. 87 and No. 98 in evaluating SELRA
initially appears problematic because Thailand did not ratify these
conventions. However, three arguments can be made in favor of applying
Conventions No. 87 and No. 98 to the evaluation of SELRA. First, the
conventions are applicable because they are the principal mechanisms for
protecting the freedom of association. 114 The Governing Body of the ILO
recognizes that "[c]omplaints relating to freedom of association may be
presented even against States which have not ratified the Conventions on
freedom of association."115 If a complaint can be brought against Thailand, it
follows that application of the conventions is proper. Second, the
108 Ly.E, supra note 93, at 23.
109 ILO Convention No. 98, at art. 1.
110 Id. at art 2.
111id. atarL 4.
112 I. at art. 3.
113 Id. at art. 6.
114 CENTER FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, UNITED NATIONS, UNITED NATIONS ACTION IN THE FIELD OF
HUMAN RIoHTS, at 232, 392 (1988).
115 Id., at 174, at page 330. An additional argument supporting this is that because the principle
of freedom of association is expressly incorporated into the ILO constitution, it is binding on all members.
LYLE, supra note 93, at 2. Since Thailand is a signatory to the ILO, it is bound to honor this principle.
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conventions are binding as customary international law because of their high
ratification rates and their recognition in many other international treaties and
country practices."l 6 Finally, regardless of whether the conventions are
technically binding on Thailand, they are still appropriate standards for
judging SELRA due to their broad international acceptance." 7
Several practical reasons exist for Thailand to honor these fundamental
rights. Thailand must be sensitive to the repercussions of ignoring
internationally accepted worker rights. ICFTU information chief Luc
Demaret noted, ".... as part of human rights, the respect for basic trade union
rights is now also increasingly used in criteria for political, economic and
trade relations between countries."118 Thus, not only may its international
image be tarnished, but Thailand may jeopardize trade relationships and
privileges if it continues to ignore these standards." 9 In addition, the threat
of labor unrest from discontent workers could have a negative impact on
foreign investment and growth for the country. It is to Thailand's benefit, as a
developing nation, to honor the right of association and the right to organize
and bargain collectively. 120
The application of Convention No. 98 in evaluating SELRA raises a
further concern because Article 6 excludes the convention's application to
public workers. 121 Article 6, however, applies only to "public servants
engaged in the administration of the State." The definition was not intended
to be inclusive of all employees working in every enterprise run by the state.
The language of a subsequent ILO convention enacted to remedy the
ambiguity makes this apparent. 122 In contrast, SELRA applies broadly to all
116 See WERNERLEVI, LAW AND POLITICS IN THE INTERNATIONAL SOCIETY 85-106 (1976). See also
PAUL SIEGHART, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF HUMAN RIGHTS 1-23, 346-349 (1983). See supra notes
99-100 for the number of countries which have ratified these conventions.1171d.
118 Union Ban Could Harm Thailand, Says Expert, BANGKOK POsT, Apr. 4, 1991, at 3. See also
supra note 46.
119 The imminent threat of losing GSP preferences is a prime example. See supra text
accompanying notes 78-84.
10 Thailand argued that "the manner of [the principles of the ILO] must be determined with due
regard to the stage of social and economic development reached by each people." Complaints Against
Thailand, supra note 10, at 451. The Freedom of Association Committee responded that these rights,
"like other basic human rights, should be respected no matter what the level of development of the
country." Id. at 462.
121 See supra text accompanying note 113.
122 Convention No. 151 was promulgated in recognition of the fact that "certain categories of public
employees" were not covered by Convention No. 98, and that "considerable expansion of public-service
activities in many countries and the need for sound labour relations between public authorities and public
employees' organizations" necessitated a specific convention. Labour Relations (Public Service)
Convention, ILO Convention No. 151 (1978).
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workers who are employed by the government in government-run
enterprises. 123 Not all of these enterprises are involved in what is typically
considered administration of the state. Application of SELRA's restrictions to
these workers raises concern.
Convention No. 87 and Convention No. 98 set forth internationally
accepted basic labor standards. Because the right of association and the right
to organize and bargain collectively are fundamental to labor rights in general,
these conventions establish a valuable framework in which to critically
analyze SELRA's effect on the inalienable rights of Thailand's public sector
workers.
PART THREE
SELRA contains many provisions of law governing the activities of
public workers. This section evaluates provisions of SELRA which may
contravene the standards set forth by Convention No. 87 and Convention No.
98. Furthermore, it examines the justifications given by the Thai government
in defense of each provision, then suggests possible solutions to bring SELRA
into conformity with international standards.
I. THE RIGHT OF ASSOCIATION DENIED UNDER SELRA
Paradoxically, SELRA allows for the formation of "associations", yet
violates the "right of association." The right of association, as defined by the
1LO, implies the right for organizations to pursue lawful activities for the
defense of their occupational interests. 124 Many of the regulations in SELRA
directly frustrate the associations' powers to pursue their occupational
interests in a meaningful manner.
A. The Right to Strike Denied Under SELRA
The right to strike is generally considered a vital part of the right of
association. It is one of the essential means through which workers and their
organizations promote and defend their economic and social interests.125 The
strike is extremely important to Thai workers. They rely heavily on the strike
as a mechanism to achieve gains, yet it is denied under SELRA.
123 See infra notes 126-130 and accompanying text.
124 DIGESTOFDECiSiONS, supra note 94, at 345.
12 5 Id. at % 362, 363.
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Section 19 of SELRA states, "Regardless of whatever the case may be,
staff are not allowed to strike or do anything which is in the nature of a
strike." Although this prohibition existed for public workers under the
LRA,126 the ability to call "extraordinary meetings" amounted to a de facto
strike, which was never deemed illegal.127 Section 28 of SELRA precludes
this alternative.
1. SELRA Imposes Limitations on the Right to Strike
Strikes are not sanctioned by the right of association unconditionally.
Three conditions exist whereby a strike ceases to be a protected right: (1) if a
strike becomes violent, 128 (2) if it involves purely political motivations, 129 or
(3) if it would interrupt essential services, thereby endangering the life, safety
and health of the public. 130
Several justifications support Thailand's ban on strikes by public sector
employees. First, a separate rule for public sector employees is necessary
because they provide vital services to the public. The realistic concern exists
that interruptions in essential services by a strike would harm the public.131
Furthermore, the structure and purpose of state enterprises differs from that of
private enterprises since state enterprises receive tax subsidies and tax
exemptions and operate as government-sanctioned monopolies. 132 Therefore,
since they can have direct repercussions on the public, strikes by public
sector employees are an inappropriate means of expressing worker
dissatisfaction.
2. Public Employees Denied the Right to Strike
SELRA prohibits the right to strike by all public employees and this
broad inclusion of every employee of every state-run enterprise simply
cannot be justified. The Freedom of Association Committee previously stated
that it is "not appropriate for all state-owned undertakings to be treated on
the same basis with respect to limitations of the right to strike." 133  The
126 LRA, § 23.
127 COUNTRY REPORTS, supra note 1, at 1009.
128 DIGEST OFDECISIONS, supra note 94, at 367.
12 9 1d. at 372.
13 0 Id. at 394.
13 1 Letter from Thomas Cadogan, Labor Reporting Officer, American Embassy, Bangkok, Oct. 22,
1992.
132 Complaints Against Thailand, supra note 10, at 452.
133 DIGEST OF DECISIONS, supra note 94, at 395.
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Committee calls for the country's legislature to draw a distinct line between
essentia1134 and non-essential services. 135  SELRA's extensive coverage
includes less essential services which should not be denied the right to strike:
ports, education, transportation, fuel and energy, and telecommunications;
136
in addition to more crucial services, such as those provided by hospitals and
waterworks. 137 SELRA must be amended to recognize the differing purposes
of various state-run enterprises.
Even with respect to essential services, the restriction on strikes cannot
be justified unless other guarantees are made to protect worker interests. The
most common safeguards include a corresponding restriction on the
employers' right of lockouts and "adequate, impartial and speedy conciliation
and arbitration proceedings."'138 Such offsets do not exist in SELRA.
3. Sanctions for Violating SELRA are Oppressive
The penalties for participating in an illegal strike under SELRA are up
to one year in prison or a fine of up to 20,000 bahtl39 or both, which is
doubled if a person "incites, or aids and abets" a strike. 140 This penalty is
double that for illegal strikes under the LRA.141 The Committee previously
established standards suggesting that sanctions should be proportionate to the
offense involved and that a worker should not be imprisoned for engaging in a
peaceful strike.142 The sanctions promulgated by SELRA are particularly
harsh and are incompatible with internationally recognized labor standards.
4. The Right to Strike Must be Restored
The right to strike must be returned to state enterprise workers. Due to
the nature of services provided by the workers, however, this right should be
134 Essential services are those which immediately affect the health and safety of the public. These
examples illustrate the Committee's idea of essential services: hospitals, waterworks and air traffic
controllers are essential; transport services, banking, teaching, and the supply and distribution of food are
not essential. Id. at 402-412.1 35 id. at 395.
136 Arguments that these services affect the health and safety of the public are, of course,
foreseeable. When the need for these services is balanced against the importance of the power to strike for
union effectiveness, however, the right to strike cannot be denied.
137 CoUNTRY REPORTs, supra note 1, at 1010.
138 Id.
139 Mvinimum wage is 100 baht per day (roughly four U.S. dollars).
140 SELRA § 45.
141 Labor Relations Act §§ 139, 140.
142 Complaints Against Thailand, supra note 10, at 477.
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limited. The government must revise its list of essential services and give all
non-essential service workers a right to strike equivalent to that of private
workers. The distinction between the two types of workers is compatible
with that set forth by the Freedom of Association Committee. For essential
services, there are two alternatives to replace the unlimited strike: allowing a
mini-version of a strike and/or implementing a system of mandatory interest
arbitration.
a. Mini-Strikes as an Alternative Weapon to the Unlimited Strike
Often strikes have been used as a way to draw the attention of an
employer to worker grievances. Thus, a smaller version of a strike still may
be effective. This could be accomplished by establishing a set number of
employees allowed to strike within each essential service, thereby keeping
enough workers to continue providing for the needs of the public.
Alternatively, the government could set a time limit on the duration of strikes
after which it would be illegal and the employees could be ordered back to
work. Effectively, at a minimum, a one day strike would allow workers to
make their grievance known without seriously disrupting services.
b. Education of Thai Workers in Dispute Resolution Required
A small version of a strike would not give employees the leverage that
a holdout would. A mini-strike would need to be supplemented with a
procedure by which employees and management could engage in fair
bargaining and dispute resolution. Mandatory interest arbitration has been
considered as an acceptable alternative to the strike, when it is adequate,
impartial, and speedy. 143  In theory, this mandatory arbitration avoids
violations of the right of association and the right to collectively bargain.
Using a system of dispute resolution in Thailand, though, leads to concerns
about effectiveness. Thai workers have been reluctant to use such a process
in the past due to the inherent complexity and the perceived management bias
associated with the method.
Several steps can be taken to make the arbitration system effective. To
avoid the same problems of the past, the government should sponsor
educational programs, preferably run by neutral international organizations, to
143 See Arvid Anderson and Loren A. Krause, Article: InterestArbitration: The Alternative to the
Strike, 58 FORDHAM L. REVIEW 153 (1987) for full discussion of mandatory interest arbitration as it has
been applied to American public workers.
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teach union representatives how to effectively use the arbitration process to
promote worker interests. In addition, arbitrators should be a neutral and
approved by both parties. In cases where much is at stake and the parties are
extremely hostile, it may be appropriate for a neutral international
organization, such as the ILO, to be employed as arbitrator.
Although mandatory arbitration may be necessary in handling workers'
interests, specific grievances should be brought before an impartial judiciary.
The system of labor courts set up under the LRA should be open to state
enterprise workers. The tripartite character of the labor courts would then
provide an impartial and adequate mechanism to hear grievances.
c. Realistic Sanctions Needed
The sanctions for illegal strikes should be reduced to be proportionate
to the seriousness of the offense. A peaceful strike should be sanctioned
minimally, whereas a violent strike should justify harsher punishment. At a
minimum, sanctions should be reduced to match those under the LRA.
B. SELRA's Registration and Membership Requirements for the
Formation ofAssociations are in Violation of Convention No. 87
Article 2 of Convention No. 87 provides that workers "shall have the
right to establish.., and join organizations of their own choosing without
previous authorization." This standard is intended to provide workers with
the choice of whom they would like to associate with and have as their
representative body. Section 21 of SELRA states, "Each state enterprise shall
have only one State Enterprise Staff Association." In addition, Section 22 of
SELRA requires that at least thirty percent of the enterprise's employees be
members of the association. This is a significant change from the LRA.
Under the LRA, a union can be formed with a minimum of ten members and
there is no limit on the number of unions which can exist within an
enterprise.44
Under SELRA, the Registrar accepts applicants for the enterprise's
association on a first-come, first-served basis. 145 Thus, the first organization
to meet all the requirements, including the thirty percent membership
14 4 Labor Relations Act of 1975, Chapter VII, § 89 (Thailand).
145 The Registrar is defined in SELRA as "the person appointed by the Minister [of Interior] to
perform in accordance with this Act." SELRA § 4(2).
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requirement, becomes the representative for that enterprise. 146 An order by
the Registrar refusing to accept an application for registration may be
appealed to the Minister of Interior. Once the first applicant is registered,
however, there is no procedure allowing an enterprise's employees to
challenge the association.
The limitation of a single association and the thirty percent membership
requirement are facial violations of the right of association. Section 21
effectively denies individual workers a choice between organizations. 147
There is no guarantee that the registered association will be representative of
the workers it purports to represent. The Freedom of Association Committee
attacked Section 22, stating "such a high numerical requirement represents a
restriction on the creation of worker's organizations in large undertakings."'148
The Committee also expressed concern over the ability of minority groups to
represent their own interests. 149 Moreover, in practice, the requirements have
caused internal turmoil between the dissolved previous unions. They have
been left to compete for the single position of the representative body within
their enterprise. 150 Such disharmony further weakens the effectiveness of the
labor organizations.
The Thai government, formed by the coup, explained that by enacting
the requirement of one association, it intended to promote solidarity among
the employees, thereby increasing their bargaining power. In the past, the
existence of several unions made it difficult for all employees to be
represented, thereby complicating the negotiation process. 151  The
government's concerns over the negotiating process are valid, but procedural
146 SELRA § 26.
147 Complaints Against Thailand, supra note 10, at 1471.
148 Id. at 472.
149 Id. SELRA also excludes non-Thai nationals from eligibility for membership in an association
(SELRA § 23). The Freedom of Association Committee has ruled that nationality, along with race,
religious beliefs, political opinions, etc., is not a valid basis for discrimination and impinges upon a
worker's right to form and join a representative organization. Id. at 473. If non-nationals are not
satisfied with the choice of organizations, they cannot form their own representative group. Although the
discriminatory effect of this requirement is a violation of ILO standards, it is not a change from the
previous law. Section 88 of the Labor Relations Act also requires union members to be of Thai
nationality. However, the requirement is still discriminatory and there is no valid justification for this
requirement. It should be abolished.15 0 FORiGNLABORTRENS, supra note 4, at 23.
151 Complaints Against Thailand, supra note 10, at 453.
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safeguards must be added to SELRA if the requirement of one association per
enterprise is to remain. 152
Safeguards are needed to ensure that the interests of all employees are
adequately represented. SELRA should require that the association be
chosen by a majority vote in an election. A membership quota is necessary to
guarantee that the majority is represented. The question is whether thirty
percent is a reasonable quota, since it leaves open the possibility that seventy
percent of the workers could be unrepresented. Alternatively, a higher
percentage might make it impossible for workers to reach the requisite
number. Thus, if an association is formed with thirty percent of the
employees, it should be subject to immediate challenge and replacement if a
larger majority is formed within the first one or two months thereafter.
Additionally, SELRA should limit the terms of associations and require
regularly scheduled elections. Such safeguards would provide public
employees the right to establish and join the organization of their choosing
and to replace an association with which they are dissatisfied. They would
further ensure that the association makes it a priority to represent all workers
as best it can.
C. No Choice at All: Thai Government Maintains Control over
Functions of Associations
The control the Registrar maintains over the functioning of the
associations raises concerns with respect to Article 3 of Convention No. 87.
Article 3 provides the right of an organization to draw up its own constitution
.and elect its own representatives "in full freedom," and to organize its own
administration and activities. It further restricts public authorities from
interfering with these rights. In contrast, Section 25(9) of SELRA requires
that the articles of an association make certain stipulations, which ultimately
give the Registrar the power to insist on the specific number of committee
members and limit the terms they serve. Section 26 of SELRA further
empowers the Registrar to screen applicants to ensure they "are not in conflict
with peace and order and good public morality", yet has no definition of these
concepts as a guide. The Registrar can also dissolve an association if it has
"committed an act that was contrary to the law or peace and order or good
152 The Thai government defends its requirements by noting that by April 1992, 37 associations
already had been registered. GSP Review, supra note 86, at 3. However, the statistics do not reveal the
nature of the representation and whether a majority of the workers are satisfied with the associations.
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public morality or was a danger to the economy or stability of the country"
and it can remove individual committee members for the same reason. 153
The power the Registrar has over both the representative committee
members and the functioning of the association directly interferes with state
enterprise workers' autonomy. The right to elect is rendered meaningless if
public authorities can immediately remove those elected. Nevertheless, these
provisions were promulgated by the Thai government to ensure honest and
qualified representatives and to prevent political activities adverse to
governmental policies. The same precautions have been taken in recent
amendments to the LRA which put strict requirements on who may represent
a union in collective bargaining. 154 To a certain extent, the Thai government
has a valid concem about the caliber of negotiations and union leadership,
considering past difficulties with the dispute settlement procedures and
politicians' influence on union leadership positions.
1. Thailand Defends its Restrictive Labor Laws
Politicization of the union movement is a major concern of government
leaders and the public. Newspapers reported that public union members
played controversial roles in politics and involved themselves in corruption
scandals.155 In its answer to the AFL-CIO's GSP complaint, the Thai
government illustrated the political corruption with an example of a series of
strikes staged during 1988-1990. The strikes were in opposition to plans to
privatize a port operation. The government alleges these were politically
motivated and that the leaders were offered rewards by certain political
groups. 156
The labor movement's reaction to the government's efforts to privatize
state enterprises is a prime example of the political role that organized labor
plays in Thailand. Labor leaders and government leaders, before and after the
coup, disagreed about this issue. The government's plan to privatize sparked
153 SELRA §§ 39, 40.
154 The advisor who represents the association for purposes of collective bargaining must be a Thai
national, must never have been insolvent or addicted to drugs, must not be immoral, never sentenced to
imprisonment, must be an executive member of a national employer or labor center or have completed a
government course on labor, must believe in monarchical democracy, and must not give advice contrary to
legal provisions, good conduct of labor relations or social harmony. Complaints Against Thailand, supra
note 10 at 481.
1 Thais in Bid to Regain Right to Strike, supra note 5.
156 Statement of the Government of Thailand to the GSP Subcommittee of the Trade Policy Staff
Committee in Opposition to the Petition of the AFL-CIO Regarding Worker Rights in Thailand (Case no.
008-CP-91), Nov. 20, 1991, at 7 [hereinafter Statement of Government].
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unrest as labor leaders viewed it as an attempt to undercut their power.
157
Additionally, since the strength of the Thai labor movement rested in public
unions, the unions naturally sought to prevent privatization. 158 Labor leaders
feared that once privatized, management sympathetic to the union movement
would be replaced by hostile employers.
159
On the other side, the government began to feel that the necessary
privatization would be impossible given the strength of the unions. The
government also feared economic disaster would result if something was not
done about union interference. State enterprises were losing -money and
Thailand needed to privatize in order to raise capital to provide essential
services and improved infrastructure (such as roads and pollution control) to
the growing industrial center of Bangkok and the outlying areas. 160 The coup
and the drastic amendments to the labor laws through Announcement 54 and
SELRA were a direct response to this predicament.
161
Since the enactment of SELRA, the progress towards privatization has
been slow. 162 Moreover, the Thai government has not since raised the labor
movement's resistance to privatization as a justification for maintaining
SELRA.163 The strict requirements on advisors and the Registrar's strong
control over them aim at preventing labor leaders from succumbing to the
undue influence of politics. The government and the public do not want the
old unions re-established for fear they will once again become a tool in the
hands of politicians and other interest groups. 164 SELRA, however, should
be restructured to address this problem without removing adequate
protections on worker rights.
2. Reform of SELRA is Necessary for Compliance With ILO Standards
The authorization of the powers of the Registrar in SELRA is
unacceptably incompatible with Article 3 of Convention No. 87. Even if the
Registrar's powers have not been exercised in a manner which impinges on
workers' rights, the potential for abuse is great. These powers should be
157 Smucker, supra note 67.
158 FOREIGNLABORTRENDS, supra note 4, at 28.
159.1d.
160 Why Egat is a Tough Nut to Crack, THE FINANCIAL TIMES LIMrrED, Apr. 9, 1990, available in
LEXIS, Nexis library, Omni file.
161 Magnier, supra note 6.
16 2 FoREIoN LABOR TRENDS, supra note 4, at 28.
163 Letter from Thomas Cadogan, supra note 131.
164 Id.
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abolished or given stricter guidelines. State enterprise workers should be
allowed to function "in full freedom" and trusted to elect qualified persons
who will best represent their interests. In addition, there are alternate ways to
control political corruption by labor leaders.
a. New Thai Government Proposes Solution to Restore Rights
The new Thai political leaders have expressed a willingness to revive
the unions. Interior Minister Chavalit recently released a policy proposal to
allow labor unions in state enterprises once again. 165 In making this proposal,
the government and Chavalit expressed that this restoration must be
accompanied by assurances from worker representatives that unions will not
become "political pressure groups." Such conditions placed on labor
organizations raise problems of incompatibility with the right of association.
Although purely political motivations should not be the focus of union
activities, it is difficult to distinguish between what is purely political and
what is political yet in furtherance of workers' occupation, economic and
social interests. The Freedom of Association Committee expressed this
concern:
If trade unions are prohibited in general terms from engaging in
any political activities, this may raise difficulties by reason of the
fact that the interpretation given to the relevant provisions may,
in practice, change at any moment and considerably restrict the
possibility of action of the organizations. 166
Demonstrations for democracy might be deemed political, but it is
questionable whether opposition by state enterprise workers to privatization
is purely political, when it is clear this would affect their occupational status.
The Committee recommends that a judicial authority police union abuses on a
case-by-case basis, rather than imposing a blanket ban on all political
activity. 167 A judicial approach should be implemented to deal with alleged
abuses in a fair manner. Furthermore, Thailand should be proactive in
preventing political abuse.
165 State Enterprise Workers Seek Meeting With Chavalit, BANGKOK POST, Oct. 21, 1992, at 2.
166 DIGEST OFDECISIONS, supra note 94, at 354.
16 7 ld.
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b. A Solution to Meet Needs of Both the Thai Government and State
Enterprise Employees
The existing requirements for labor representatives and the proposed
restrictions on political activities give the government excessive control over
association leaders and restrict workers' freedom to elect their representative.
The Thai governme.nt needs to compromise if it wants to solve the problems
of political corruption. So far, it has only addressed the problem through
restrictions on worker organizations; this negative response is not sufficient.
A Thai newspaper keenly stated the problem: "ignoring their [union members]
demands for too long opens the way for manipulation of the labor movement
by political groups or the military. . .. "168 The Thai government must be
willing to give the labor movement a voice in government policy that directly
affects labor.169 This is what union leaders have been seeking all along, but
have been denied over and over again.170 The government may be resistant
to giving organized labor groups this type of power, especially since unions
officially represent only three percent of industrial workers. Those not
affiliated with unions, however, are being represented by unions and are
receiving benefits from the progress made by unions. In any event, giving
unions a direct voice in the policy-making process would help circumvent
subversive political influences and make labor representatives publicly
accountable.
D. Distinction Between Associations and Unions Have Crippling Effect
on Labor Movement
Article 5 of Convention No. 87 specifically provides the right to
establish and join federations. SELRA does not contain a provision for the
formation or prohibition of federations. It does not appear possible, however,
for state enterprise associations to join federations comprised of private
16 8 Denise Young, Thai Labour Unrest Signals Rough Ride For Government, THE REuTER LIBRARY
REPORT, July 27, 1989, available in LEXIS, Nexis library, Omni file.
169 Policies which deserve input from labor include: social security, safety in the workplace,
maximum hours, and wages. Labor representatives do sit on the National Wage Committee, however this
representation was lowered from five worker representatives to three under the new laws. Amorn, supra
note 3.
170 Labor representatives have asked for weekly meetings with the ministers in the Prime Minister's
office. They have expressed a desire for a forum like the "joint public-private sector consultative
committee" as a means for workers to impact policy making. Smucker, supra note 67. Recently, labor
leaders were denied their request to participate in amending SELRA to resolve the issues the prohibition
of unions have raised. Revision of State Firm Laws Urged, BANGKoKPOST, Jan. 8, 1993, at 3.
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workers because sections 5 and 113 of the Labor Relations Act require that
federations under that act may only consist of trade unions registered
thereunder. Thus, the implications of the absence of a provision for
federations are unclear. The Thai government claims this silence means
associations are free to form federations of their own.171 The govermnent
also points out that some associations continue their affiliation with
international federations.172 The actual problem, however, is the distinction
drawn between the two labor groups and its impact on the entire labor
movement because public unions have not been able to confederate with
private unions.
State enterprise workers at one time comprised one-half of total union
membership, which made their unions the much larger than private sector
unions. 173 The abolition of state enterprise unions thus heavily impacted the
entire labor movement, which was already small in numbers. 174 Furthermore,
private unions can no longer rely on the assistance they previously received
from public sector unions. 175 The distinction drawn between the two groups
creates an obstacle to unity and cohesion within the labor movement, which is
necessary to push forward on issues such as wages and better working
conditions.
A further distinction between the private and public labor groups was
made several months after SELRA was enacted. A ruling by the Juridical
Council said that state enterprise employees are not "workers" since they are
not defined as such under SELRA. Therefore, the Interior Minister
overturned the election of three state enterprise workers to serve on the Prime
Minister's advisory council on labor development. This further reduced the
public unions' clout. 176
The governance of the private and public sectors by different laws may
be justified for certain circumstances. 177  Nonetheless, the nominal
differences should not prevent employees from working together to promote
171 Statement of Government, supra note 156, at 7.
172 For instance, the newly established associations of three electricity-generating state enterprises
have continued membership with Public Services International (PSI) federation. Complaints Against
Thailand, supra note 10, at 454.17 3 FOREIGN LABOR TRENDS, supra note 4, at 8.
174 "The dissolution of State Enterprise unions may have had a muting effect on the organization of
new unions. Only 43 new unions organized in 1991, against 142 in 1990." Id. at 8.
175 See supra text accompanying note 68.
176 issarapong Snub For State Firm Unionists, BANGKOK POST, Sep. 17, 1991, at 3.
177 Interest bargaining over financial matters, see infra text accompanying note 191, and limiting
the right to strike in essential services, see supra text accompanying note 130, are examples of
circumstances where different treatment under labor laws is valid.
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their common interests. A law is needed that provides state enterprise
associations equal status and the same privileges as private unions. They
should be allowed to confederate to work together for common goals.
E. Restrictions on Meetings Under SELRA are Incompatible With
Convention 87
In addition to providing the right to elect representatives and run their
administrations in full freedom, Article 3 of Convention No. 87 also provides
for the right to engage in union-related activities. 178 Section 28 of SELRA
provides, "A general meeting, regardless of what the case may be, can only
be held on a day that is a government holiday or a traditional public holiday."
This requirement forecloses the alternative to the strike which was used under
the Labor Relations Act, i.e., calling "extraordinary meetings" which took
workers off the job for days' 79 and had the same effect as a strike in getting
the employer's attention. Despite the absence of this method, the requirement
itself is a bar to the effectiveness of associations, since it is difficult to
organize a meeting and have full participation outside the workplace.
According to the Freedom of Association Committee, an organization should
have the right to hold meetings on work premises without prior approval and
without interference.18 0
It is a valid concern that association meetings could interfere with
worker responsibilities and productivity, but there are other ways to limit
such effects. For instance, if SELRA limits the length of meetings, both
employers and employees could be accommodated by allowing the meeting at
the workplace, but ensuring that they do not interfere with the job. Also, if
employees are not paid for time spent in these meetings, employees will be
self-policing. Thus, the government's concern can be easily remedied without
violating minimum labor standards.
F. Dissolution of the Unions
Article 4 of Convention No. 87 provides that "workers' and employers'
organizations shall not be liable to be dissolved or suspended by
administrative authority." This standard is based on the principle of due
178 Hold meetings for its members, or engage in collective bargaining, for example.
179 CouNTRY REPORTS, supra note 1, at 1009.
180 Complaints Against Thailand, supra note 10, at 475. See also DIGEST OF DECISIONS, supra
note 94, at 142.
WINTER 1993
PACIFIC RIm LAW & POLICY JOURNAL
process and the belief that an organization should have an opportunity to
defend its case through a judicial process with the right to appeal a decree of
dissolution. Furthermore, the Freedom of Association Committee suggested
that dissolution of a trade union should occur only in extreme
circumstances. 181 SELRA's Section 55 mandates, "All the trade unions of
state enterprises that were set up under the laws governing labor relations
shall cease to exist, except for operations to liquidate them." Labor leaders
were not given the opportunity to plead their case before SELRA was
enacted.' 82 The unilateral nature of the legislation was an unfair infringement
on the rights of the organized labor movement. 183
I. RIGHT TO ORGANIZE AND BARGAIN COLLECTIVELY DENIED UNDER
SELRA
The infringements on the right of association discussed above pertain
to employees' relations with the government. The right to organize and
bargain collectively, on the other hand, addresses the employer-employee
relationship. In the case of public sector employees, the government is the
employer. The right to organize and bargain collectively nevertheless applies
in this context, treating the government's role simply as employer.
Two aspects of SELRA appear incompatible with the right to organize
and bargain collectively, as defined by the ILO Convention No. 98. First,
SELRA fails to provide adequate protection against anti-union bias on the
part of employers. Second, the mechanism established for negotiations over
worker concerns and grievances is inadequate. These defects should be
cured in order to bring SELRA into compliance with basic labor standards.
A. Protection Against Anti-Union Bias Inadequate
Article 1 of Convention No. 98 provides for protection against acts of
anti-union discrimination, particularly employment conditioned upon
181 Complaints Against Thailand, supra note 10, at 469.
182 To the contrary, union leaders were told union rights and activities would not be restricted. Id.
at 445.
183 The Freedom of Association Committee also found fault with Section 55 of SELRA which
provides for the disposition of the former unions' property after its dissolution. Id. at 470. Under
Section 55, if union assets are left over after liquidation, and there is no union rule governing the
distribution of the property, then the remaining assets shall be transferred to the Thai Red Cross. In
reality, this default provision has not caused problems, but it should still be eliminated.
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nonmembership and dismissals of workers who are members or participate in
union activities. Section 20 of SELRA provides:
Management is not allowed to terminate the employment of, or
transfer, staff for the reason that the staff has taken steps to
request for the establishment of an association, or to participate
as a member or committee member of an association ....
SELRA does not, however, provide protection for those who are
discriminated against in the hiring process based on their union activity.
Thus, workers who have a reputation of involvement in union activities in the
past may be effectively shut out from obtaining work in a state enterprise, and
the discrimination would be legal. Section 20 of SELRA also fails to provide
any guarantee that the fundamental right against discrimination will be
honored or that an aggrieved party will be able to seek redress. In contrast,
Chapter IX of the LRA sets forth explicit rules against unfair treatment and
their enforcement.' 84 Protective language similar to that of the LRA should
be incorporated into SELRA as well.
B. Inadequate Negotiating Machinery
Article 3 of Convention No. 98 requires that "[m]achinery appropriate
to national conditions shall be established, where necessary, for the purpose
of ensuring respect for the right to organize .... "In addition, Article 4 calls
for measures "to encourage and promote the full development and utilization
of machinery for voluntary negotiations . . . ." SELRA has established
Activities Relations Committees (ARCs),185 one for each state enterprise, to
deal with all collective bargaining efforts and to hear worker grievances, such
as discrimination cases. 186 The association elects its representatives to the
ARC, but if no association exists within the enterprise, the government and
the employer will appoint the representative. The role of these committees is
limited. They may hear worker complaints and proposals to improve working.
184 Sections 121 through 123 of the LRA prohibit an employer from terminating an employee based
on union membership or activities; obstructing employees from becoming a member or causing them to
resign; obstructing labor union or federation business; and coercing or threatening against union
membership. Sections 124 through 127 sets forth the process of filing a complaint with the Labor
Relations Committee, and provides for possible ensuing criminal prosecutions for violations.
185 The ARCs are composed of a member of the state enterprise's board directors and an equal
number of representatives from management and employees. SELRA § 14.
186 SELRA, Ch. 2, §§ 14-18.
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conditions. If proposals require negotiation of fiscal matters, however, the
deliberations of the ARC must be submitted for approval to the national State
Enterprise Labor Relations Committee (SELRC).187 Thus, issues of wages
and financial benefits ultimately lie with the SELRC for all final decisions.
This has a profound negative effect on the autonomy of the state employees
and "is contrary to the promotion of voluntary negotiation of workers' terms
and conditions of employment .... ,188
The composition of the SELRC also raises serious concerns over the
effectiveness of the bargaining mechanism established by SELRA.' 89
Because it is heavily weighted to the side of employers, the committee is not
a suitable forum for equitable collective bargaining efforts.190 In addition, the
composition of the committee allows the potential for collusion against
employee interests. Moreover, workers are reluctant to utilize a system they
perceive as biased. These factors diminish the effectiveness of the ARCs and
the SELRC in promoting worker interests.
Thailand asserts that it established the system to allow for more
involvement by workers and to provide a speedier process. Furthermore, in
dealing with government-run enterprises, decisions affecting its budget
require government approval. The two-tiered process of the ARC and
SELRC is shorter than the previous process and actually allows for more
participation on a higher level. 191  Under the LRA, any demands or
complaints having financial implications could not be decided by the LRCs,
but had to be submitted to the Ministry of Finance for consideration. At least
under SELRA, a committee which includes worker representatives makes the
final decision. The presence of worker representatives on the SELRC does
not, however, in reality, give workers any more power than under the old
system.
While the system under SELRA is not adequate to effectively and
fairly address worker interests or hear grievances, the ARCs appear to be a
fair avenue for workers to bring their concerns. The ARCs could also
effectively engage in interest arbitration, but because many of the concerns
187 SELRA § 18.
188 Complaints Against Thailand, supra note 10, at 478.
189 The SELRC's 21 members are as follows: Five government officials (Minister of Interior,
Permanent Secretaries of Ministries of Finance and Interior, the Comptroller-General, and
Director-General of Department of Labor); five "experts" appointed by the government; five
representatives of selected by state enterprise management; five workers' representatives, and the Chief of
the Office serving the committee. SELRA § 6.
190 Complaints Against Thailand, supra note 10, at 479; GSP Review, supra note 86, at 6.
191 Complaints Against Thailand, supra note 10, at 457.
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raised by workers will most likely affect the government's budget, the ARCs
will not be effective until the SERLC is changed. One solution to change the
composition of the SELRC is to give the employee representation equal
weight against the government. SELRA should also include guidelines
specifying which issues must be reviewed by the SELRC. The list should be
short and narrowly defined, leaving ARCs as much discretion as possible. A
final alternative would be to abolish the SELRC altogether and, instead,
submit decisions reached by the ARCs directly to the Ministry of Finance for
approval.
The grievance process provided in SELRA also needs to be amended
because of the potential for abuse within the SELRC. The Thai government
states that if employees are dissatisfied with a decision made by SELRC, they
can take their case to the courts of law.' 92 There is, however, no specific
provision for this in SELRA. The right to resort to the labor courts must be
explicitly provided for in SELRA in order to ensure employees know what
recourse they have after receiving an unfavorable decision by SELRC. In
cases not involving fiscal matters, appeals from the ARCs should go directly
to the courts. The present system does not adequately ensure that employees
have an adequate, impartial and speedy mechanism to protect and promote
their economic and social interests.
Thailand has also supported its mechanism for collective bargaining by
citing bargaining victories already won by state enterprise workers. In
February 1992, the SELRC agreed to give state enterprise workers a wage
increase of twenty to twenty-three percent, when only a sixteen percent
increase was requested. 193 These statistics do not, however, prove the
effectiveness of collective bargaining. To the contrary, the generous wage
increase appears suspect, and may have been granted, regardless of
negotiation efforts, in anticipation of the review by the GSP Subcommittee on
labor conditions in Thailand. Indeed, the GSP Subcommittee viewed this
increase as favorable in its review of the SELRC. 194
CONCLUSION
Before SELRA, public unions played a vital role in the organized labor
movement. Despite their small numbers, public unions possessed the strength
19 2 Id. See supra note 74.
193 GSP Review, supra note 86, at 6.
19 4 Id.
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and clout to securing basic economic and social provisions for all workers.
The enactment of SELRA effectively put an end to their momentum.
Thailand's state enterprise workers will continue to pursue social and
economic conditions despite SELRA's impingements on their rights to
organize. Nevertheless, the problems created by SELRA must be resolved.
At a minimum, state enterprise workers should be granted rights equal to their
private counterparts organized under the LRA. More importantly, SELRA
must be amended to comply with internationally accepted basic labor
standards as they are espoused by ILO Conventions No. 87 and 98.
Strong reasons exist for Thailand to honor these conventions. First,
although perhaps not technically binding, the Freedom of Association
Committee of the ILO has found Thailand to be in violation of these widely
accepted labor standards. As a member of the ILO, Thailand should not
ignore these fundamental standards.
In addition, there are strong economic reasons for Thailand to amend
SELRA. Labor unrest will continue to be a serious concern for Thailand as it
undergoes the growing pains of becoming an industrialized nation.195 The
threat of labor unrest could have a negative impact on foreign investment and
growth for the country. Thailand must adapt its labor policies in order to
avoid negative economic consequences. Compliance with internationally
recognized labor standards will not only enable Thailand to escape conflict,
but it will also send a message to the world that Thailand it is poised to
become an industrialized nation. 196
195 Thai Boom Leaves Poor Behind, AGENCE FRANcE PREssE, Jan. 11, 1993.
196 At the tiime of publication, the Thai government had proposed a bill which would allow one
labor union to be set up within each state enterprise. All state enterprise unions would be allowed to form
a single labor federation. This proposal will be brought before the United States to avoid trade sanctions
under the GSP program. Labour Official To Brief US On Workers' Rights, BANGKOK POST, Mar. 18,
1993, available in LEXIS, Nexis library, Omni file.
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